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Abstract The interpretation of quantum mechanics is an area of increas-
ing interest to many working physicists. In particular, interest has come from
those involved in quantum computing and information theory, as there has al-
ways been a strong foundational element in this field. This paper introduces
one interpretation of quantum mechanics, a modern ‘many-worlds’ theory,
from the perspective of quantum computation. Reasons for seeking to in-
terpret quantum mechanics are discussed, then the specific ‘neo-Everettian’
theory is introduced and its claim as the best available interpretation de-
fended. The main objections to the interpretation, including the so-called
“problem of probability” are shown to fail. The local nature of the interpre-
tation is demonstrated, and the implications of this both for the interpreta-
tion and for quantum mechanics more generally are discussed. Finally, the
consequences of the theory for quantum computation are investigated, and
common objections to using many worlds to describe quantum computing
are answered. We find that using this particular many-worlds theory as a
physical foundation for quantum computation gives several distinct advan-
tages over other interpretations, and over not interpreting quantum theory
at all.
Introduction
Recent years have seen a small, but steady, increase in interest surround-
ing the interpretation of quantum mechanics. There is a growing awareness
that previously the boundaries of what can be investigated in physics have
been drawn too tightly, and that questions that have formerly been rejected
as meaningless may in fact correctly be asked. Perhaps the most important
of these questions concern what exists. What, for instance, are the physi-
cal processes of quantum mechanics? What is the physical structure of the
Address(es) of author(s) should be given
2universe? The different ways of answering these questions gives rise to the
different ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics. The aim of this paper is
to give an introduction to one such interpretation, a ‘many worlds’ theory.
This will be done from the specific point of view of quantum computation;
anecdotally, this is a field in which curiosity about these questions has been
relatively strong. This presentation will, however, be accessible (and, hope-
fully, interesting) to those working within any area of quantum mechanics. I
will not assume any previous acquaintance with issues involved in interpret-
ing quantum mechanics, and will keep the exposition as free from technical
terminology as possible. Readers with a background in this area may there-
fore find some of the discussion to be a little circuitous but not, I hope,
confusing. A ‘suggestions for further reading’ section is included at the end
for any readers wishing to follow up on the material presented here.
Interpreting quantum mechanics
Why do we need to interpret quantum mechanics? This is probably the most
widespread immediate response to the enterprise. After all, we have had
nearly a century of dazzling discoveries, both theoretical and technological,
courtesy of the formalism of quantum mechanics, none of which seem to
require any commitment to a given interpretation. The ‘shut up and calculate’
method has become so standard that very often any deviation from it is
viewed with suspicion. Where, then, is the need for an interpretation?
To begin to answer this, let us ask ourselves a couple of questions about
quantum mechanics. The first question to consider is: why is it so successful?
Why does the formalism (plus the Born rule) work so well at predicting
the results of experiments? This is a fairly basic question, and the fairly
obvious answer is that it is a true theory. Quantum mechanics works because
it is correct: within its limitations (a necessary caveat as we do not have a
quantum gravity) it is right.
So what do we mean when we say that quantum mechanics is true? What
is it that makes it true? The temptation at this point is to say that what we
mean by true is correct: it correctly predicts future behaviour. Unfortunately
this is not a very good answer to our original question, as we have put
ourselves in the position of saying that quantum mechanics works because it
works! We know it does work; what makes this the case?
This is actually another basic question to which a basic answer can be
given: quantum mechanics is true because of the way things behave in the
world. Quantum mechanics accurately represents the way the world works:
atoms etc (or some other kind of ‘stuff’) move around and interact in such
a way that the quantum formalism can be used to predict what will happen
to them. In short, quantum mechanics is true because that’s the way that
physical reality is set up.
Let us look at a simple example of what we mean here. Consider a black
box containing some electronics (configuration unknown) with a switch and
a light. Certain ways of toggling the switch will make the light blink in
various ways. After experimenting with this box we come up with a method
of predicting what patterns of blinks follow which inputs. This is a true
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box work. If we were to open it up we would see a circuit that controlled
how the output responded to the input. Because of the way this circuit in
the box behaves, our theory of input and flashes is correct; put another way,
what determines whether our theory is true or not is the configuration of
electronics in the box.
These two fairly trivial questions, why quantum mechanics works and
why it is true, lead us, rather surprisingly, to a non-trivial conclusion. If
the world is set up such that quantum mechanics is true, then that quantum
mechanics is true can in itself tell us something about the set-up of the world.
If quantum mechanics were not true, then physical reality would have to be
different. So the fact that we find that it is true gives us information about
the world. In our box example, if the box responded to inputs in a different
way then the electronics inside would have to be configured differently. So
how the inputs and outputs relate tells us things about how the electronics
are put together. Indeed, were we knowledgeable enough about electronics
then we might even be able to deduce the circuit structure from those alone,
without having to open the box. Moving back to quantum mechanics, our
trivial questions, therefore, lead us to ask very significant ones: what must
physical reality look like in order for quantum mechanics to work? What is
the physical structure of the world? What sort of physical things exist, and
how do they behave?
It is these questions that are addressed by an interpretation. An ‘inter-
pretation’ of quantum mechanics is a physical theory of how the world works
such that quantum mechanics gives us correct predictions. All of these theo-
ries give the same results as the standard formalism for current observations
and experiments, but some of them give different predictions in certain (usu-
ally extreme) situations. For example, some hidden-variables theories modify
the Schro¨dinger equation slightly. Some interpretations also make predic-
tions that are simply outside the scope of the formalism. For example, in
some dynamical collapse theories it takes a certain amount of time for the
wavefunction to collapse at measurement, time which in theory is measur-
able. All of this is very much ‘in theory’: at the moment we do not have the
experimental capability to distinguish between interpretations.
This does not, however, mean that we have no way of choosing between
interpretations in order to find the best one, that is the one that most accu-
rately reflects reality. We always have more criteria than experimental results
with which to chose between our theories. To take an extreme example, let
us return to our black box. Suppose I am very good at electronics and can
work out the circuit without opening the box. As an alternative ‘interpreta-
tion’ of the box I can postulate the existence of a pink candy-floss daemon
sitting in the box flashing the light on and off whenever the switch is pressed.
If we cannot open the box then we cannot tell the difference between these
two theories experimentally. We would not, however, send an article into
Physical Review citing the pink candy-floss daemon as the explanation for
the box’s behaviour. For fairly obvious reasons, demonic candy-floss (of any
colour) is a worse explanation of what happens inside the box than the circuit
explanation. It is much less simple than the alternative: we would have to
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candy-floss became sentient, how it got into the box, why it is giving that
output for that input, etc. It also requires us to add to our collection of things
that exist: the circuit theory needs only the existence of electronics (to which
we already – presumably – subscribe), whereas the alternative requires pink
candy-floss daemons to exist as well. So we go with the best explanation for
the behaviour of the box: the circuit.
Although no-one has yet advanced a pink candy-floss interpretation of
quantum mechanics, we can use the same criterion to select between the ones
that we do have: which is the best explanation of the observed phenomena
(that the quantum formalism works)? We will be looking in detail here at one
particular interpretation, a ‘many worlds’ or ‘Everett’ style theory. We will
concentrate on this one as it is the best of the available interpretations, for
reasons that will be given. Another, better, interpretation may of course come
along later and supercede it. That, however, is a possible fate for any physical
theory: we can only ever choose between the theories that we actually have.
At any given time, it is our best available theory that we want to look at. If
we want to know how the world is, it is that theory that we ask. That theory
might turn out to be wrong in the future, but at a given time it is the best
guide that we have to the way the world is set up, and we are entitled to
follow it.
Introducing many worlds
A good way to introduce the main ideas of the many worlds interpretation is
to look at what is called the measurement problem. As we all know, quantum
mechanics predicts undetermined states for microscopic objects most of the
time: for example, in an interferometer the photon path is indeterminate
between the two arms of the apparatus. We deal with such states all the
time, and are seemingly happy with them for the unobservable realm.
Such happiness is destroyed when we consider an experiment (such as the
infamous Schro¨dinger’s Cat set-up [1]) where macroscopic outcomes are made
dependent on microscopic states. We are then faced with an ‘amplification
of indeterminism’ up to the macro-realm: the state of the system+cat is
something like
|0〉 ⊗ |cat dead〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |cat alive〉 (1)
This is the measurement problem: how do we reconcile the fact that quan-
tum mechanics predicts macroscopic indeterminism with the fact that we
observe a definite macro-realm in everyday life?
Almost all proposed solutions to the measurement problem start from
this assumption: that a superposition of states such as (1) cannot describe
macroscopic physical reality. In one way or another all terms bar one are made
to vanish, leaving the ‘actual’ physical world. The exception to this way of
solving the problem was first proposed by Everett [2]. His interpretation has
since been modified and improved, but the central posit remains the same:
that physical reality at all levels is described by states such as (1), and each
term in such a superposition is equally actualized.
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Everettian interpretations that we have (Many Worlds, Many Minds, etc.
etc. etc.). One thing we can say about all Everett interpretations is that they
include at some level and to some degree a multiplicity of what we would
commonly refer to as the ‘macroscopic world’: each term in the superposition
is actual, the cat is both dead and alive.
Even before we go further than this, there are two pressing problems here
for the Everettian. Firstly, there is the logical problem: how can anything
be in two states at once? Secondly, we have the measurement problem itself:
if all terms are real, why do we only see one? Looking at the first problem,
we note that we do not get a logical contradiction when something is in two
different states with respect to an external parameter. For example, I am
both sitting at my desk typing and standing by the window drinking tea,
with respect to the parameter time: now I am at my desk, but (hopefully)
soon I will be drinking tea. The parameter in Everett theories with respect to
which cats, etc., have their properties is variously called the world, branch,
universe, or macrorealm. The idea (at a very basic level) is that in one world
(branch, etc.) the cat is dead, and in another it is alive. Extending this to
include experimenters we get the answer to our second question: in one world
the experimenter sees the cat dead, in another she sees it alive.
We now have the problem of making these rather vague ideas concrete.
As noted above, the differing ways of doing this give rise to different Everett-
style interpretations. We shall now turn to a specific theory (chosen as the
best of the Everett-style theories on offer), an amalgam of the ideas of Everett
[2], Saunders [3,4], Vaidman [5] and Zurek [6,7], and the expansion of these
by Wallace [8,9] and Butterfield [10], which we will call the neo-Everettian
interpretation1.
The neo-Everettian interpretation
The main ideas of the neo-Everettian interpretation are the following. The to-
tality of physical reality is represented by the state |Ψ〉: the ‘universal state’.
There is no larger system than this. Within this main structure we can iden-
tify substructures that behave like what we would intuitively call a single
universe (the sort of world we see around us). There are many such sub-
structures, which we identify as single universes with different histories. The
identification of these substructures is not fundamental or precise - rather,
they are defined for all practical purposes (FAPP), using criteria such as
distinguishableness and stability over time, with decoherence playing an im-
portant role such an identification.
The main structure is often termed the ‘multiverse’ to distinguish it from
the many ‘universe’ substructures. In each of these universes in turn we can
find smaller substructures which are in general more localized than an entire
universe. These are known as worlds. For example, we would describe (1) as
referring to worlds of the Schro¨dinger cat apparatus, without reference to the
state of the rest of the universe/multiverse. An important aspect of worlds
1 I am indebted to Harvey Brown for this moniker.
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the case that if we can identify certain worlds at certain times then we will
necessarily be able to identify them at all subsequent times. We will see that
the important point is how long we want to be able to identify the worlds
for: if they are stable over those time-scales then we can use them.
The main mechanism from which we gain this stability of worlds is deco-
herence. It is the linchpin of the neo-Everettian response to the measurement
problem, allowing the stable evolution of definite substructures of universes
within the universal state. We will not here go through all the mechanics of
the decoherence process (this may be found in many places, for example [11]
and [12]), but merely state the relevant points. One interesting result of this
use of decoherence that we will see is the explanation of why measurement
has been so important in quantum theory. Measurements generally decohere
the system being measured, by coupling them to a large environment. Mea-
surement is therefore important as one way in which decoherence happens; it
is also important to note, however, that this removes the idea of measurement
as a fundamental concept in quantum mechanics.
Decoherence occurs when a system becomes entangled with a larger envi-
ronment. If we then look at the behaviour of the system alone then we have to
trace out the environment, which leads to the loss of the interference terms
between states of the decoherence basis2. Thus, at any given instant, we
can identify a multiplicity of non-interfering substructures, which are worlds.
Furthermore this lack of interference persists over time if decoherence is on-
going: that is, individual substructures (elements of the decoherence basis)
evolve virtually independently, with minimal interference with other such
substructures.
We now find ourselves with the problem of precisely how we are to define
these worlds. This is perhaps the part of a many-worlds interpretation that
is the hardest. For example, in a na¨ıve many worlds interpretations (eg [13])
one cannot find the preferred basis to specify the worlds using decoherence
as their structure is absolute and decoherence, as is well known, is only
an approximate process: we get a specification of branches for all practical
purposes (FAPP), but not in any absolute sense. It is a common assertion in
the literature on the preferred basis problem that the preferred basis must be
defined absolutely, explicitly and precisely, and that therefore the failure to
give such a definition (and indeed the impossibility of doing so) is a terminal
problem for an Everett interpretation.
By contrast, in the neo-Everettian interpretation the worlds structure is
not absolute, and so no such explicit or precise rule is required3. The key
to understanding how this works is to move away from the idea, implicit in
much of the literature, that the measurement problem must be solved at the
level of the basic theory: that is, that we must recover a single macrorealm
(or the appearance of one) in the fundamental posits of our theory. The
2 The decoherence basis for large objects is one in which position and momentum
can be (approximately) well defined, and which is stable over long time-scales – a
‘classical-like’ basis.
3 This vital understanding is found in [9], from which the material for this section
is taken.
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Wallace’s phrase, as ‘higher order ontology’. The structures of the worlds
and branches are not precisely defined, but FAPP they are a useful way
to look at the overall state. Furthermore, we as observers are some such
structures, and so we must look at the evolution of these structures and the
rest of the state relative to them in order to recover predictions about the
world we live in from quantum mechanics – which also gives us the answer
to the measurement problem.
Physics (and indeed science in general) is no stranger to the idea of using
approximately-defined structures. In everyday life we deal with them all the
time. For example, we can go to the beach and (if we are in a suitably
meditative mood) count the waves as they come in. If we are feeling more
energetic then we can paddle out and use one particular wave to surf on. The
waves exist as real entities (I can count them and surf on them), they persist
over time as distinct structures (we can follow them as they come into shore
and break), and if I surfed on one then I would talk about the wave I caught.
Waves are, however, not precisely defined: where does this wave end and
that one begin? Where does this one end and the sea begin? Different water
molecules comprise it at different points in its history – given this, how is the
wave defined? We cannot find any method that will tell us absolutely when
a given molecule is part of the wave or not, and this is not merely a technical
impossibility: there is simply no fact of the matter about when a wave ends
and the sea begins. We can use rough rules of thumb, but at the fine-grained
level there is no precise fact to find.
We thus see that there are many objects that we would unhesitatingly
call real that we nevertheless cannot define absolutely and objectively. Such
entities are part of our higher order ontology, not ‘written in’ directly in
the fundamental laws of the theory, but nevertheless present and real and
explanatorily useful.
It is at such a level that the neo-Everett concept of a world operates. It is
not an entity written into the fundamental laws of the interpretation: in fact,
what neo-Everett does is (merely?) explain how, from quantum mechanics
alone (decoherence is a straightforward consequence of the basic laws), the
structures can emerge that describe the world that we see around us every-
day4. These structures are not (and cannot be) absolutely defined, but this
is no argument against their reality.
The standard neo-Everettian approach, which stops here, leaves us with
something of a problem as regards quantum computing. If worlds are these
entities defined by decoherence, which therefore do not interfere to any great
extent, then a many-worlds analysis of a quantum computation simply says
that there is one world, in which the computation is happening, and that
is it. Not unreasonably, we might wonder why we should bother with the
interpretation at all. What we can do, however, is to extend the standard
approach into the domain of quantum computation, using the principles that
4 This is in fact one of the great strengths of neo-Everett as an interpretation:
there are no mathematics added to standard quantum mechanics (a strength par-
ticularly for those physicists who do not wish a theory to be changed for conceptual
or philosophical reasons); it is truly an interpretation.
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In this we are definitely departing from the standard neo-Everettian approach
but not, I would argue, by very much.
The fundamental principle of the neo-Everettian approach is that all parts
of the state are real. Most of the time we prefer to talk about the decom-
position of the state into worlds because that is what we are familiar with:
one particle has one spin, one computation step computes one value, etc.
How we perform this decomposition is entirely up to us. Usually we prefer
worlds that do not interfere very much with each other, and which preserve
this independence and are stable over quite long time-scales. However, the
notion of recognizing familiar patterns within a state can be extended into
the situation where that state is coherent. The time-scale over which these
patterns will persist will be much shorter than that of worlds given by deco-
herence – they may, indeed, be de facto instantaneous. However, if they are
useful then we are entitled to use them.
Defining worlds within a coherent state in this way is a simple extension of
the FAPP principle that has been described above. If our practical purposes
allow us to deal with rapidly changing worlds-structures then we may. As
we are dealing with coherent states, the worlds-structures will in general be
subject to interference over the time-scale of an operation, and the ‘relevant
time-scales’ over which worlds are defined will be smaller than that of the
single operation. This is not, however, a real difference from situations in
which decoherence defines the worlds, as even then we have to deal with the
(albeit generally theoretical rather than practical) possibility of decoherent
systems re-cohering.
So in order to use the neo-Everettian approach for quantum computation
we are extending the set of circumstances in which a ‘world’ is defined. This is
in line with the underlying motivation of the neo-Everett approach, in which
we identify familiar patterns within a state that are stable and independent
over relevant time-scales. The relevant time-scales which we will use will
be defined entirely FAPP – and can include instantaneous time-scales. Such
objects, though, remain ‘worlds’: they are the familiar objects of a decoherent
system over the relevant time-scales.
This fits in well with intuitions that are often expressed about the nature
of quantum computations, especially those based on the quantum Fourier
transform [14] and quantum walks methods of computation [15]. There are
frequently statements to the effect that it looks like there are multiple copies
of classical computations happening within the quantum state. If one classical
state from a decomposition of the (quantum) input state is chosen as an
input, then the computation runs in a certain way. If the quantum input
state is used then it looks as if all the classical computations are somehow
present in the quantum one. We will go into greater detail later on about
the nature of computation under a many-worlds picture, but for now we will
simply say that the recognition of multiple worlds in a coherent states seems
both to be a natural notion for a quantum information theorist, and also a
reasonable notion in any situation where ‘relevant’ time-scales are short.
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Now that we have seen in detail what the basics of the neo-Everettian ap-
proach are, it is time to deal with common objections, both to a many-worlds
view of quantum mechanics in general, and to the neo-Everettian version in
particular. These are what is known as the “incredulous stare” argument,
and the problem of probability, which is arguably the biggest problem faced
by the Everettian of any stripe.
The incredulous stare
Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity.
This is the oft-cited piece of advice that, traditionally, William of Ockham
gives us on constructing our physical theories. One of the most common ob-
jections to any many-worlds theory is that it violates Ockham’s Razor by
massive multiplication of entities (ie worlds). This objection can take the
form of simply saying that one cannot really be serious in thinking there is
such a mind-bogglingly huge number of worlds. At a rather more sophisti-
cated level, the objection is that such a huge increase in what we are com-
mitting ourselves to believe exists cannot but tell against the theory.
Things are not, however, this simple. We do not think that one theory
is better than another simply because one commits us to less ‘stuff’ than
the other. Modern cosmology tells us that the universe is so big that “you
just won’t believe how vastly, hugely, mind-bogglingly big it is,”5 [16], and
yet we much prefer it as a cosmological theory to the Aristotelian universe
that ended just beyond Saturn. The same may be said for atomic theory:
rather than accepting that, say, there is one table here, we must accept that
there are vast numbers of atoms and sub-atomic particles stuck together –
not only that there is more ‘stuff’ than an alternative table-only theory, but
that there are more kinds of stuff than the alternative. Another example is
dark matter: this is the postulation again of large quantities of a completely
different type of ‘stuff’, and yet this is not generally considered to be a fatal
flaw in the theory.
The clue to all this lies in Ockham’s Razor itself – entities are not be
multiplied beyond necessity. We do not choose between theories simply by
looking at which theory postulates the fewest entities or types of entities. If
the entities are necessary then we are entitled to have them in our theory.
So what makes an entity ‘necessary’ in this context? An entity becomes
necessary if it is given by the best explanation of the observed phenomena
that the theory is trying to account for. Our best theories of cosmology
include a huge universe containing vast quantities of matter – and so we
accept its existence, multiplying our entities enormously, but not beyond
necessity. The same is true for atomic theory and dark matter, although
5 As an aside, this must surely be an objection to the simple ‘incredulous stare’:
given that the enormity of a single universe creates boggling, in what sense is
the boggle produced by many universes that much worse? And why is one boggle
acceptable and the other not?
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the latter gives us some additional insights into the process. Dark matter is
postulated because we don’t want to give up on such a large set of successful
theories. In order to keep those theories intact, we need to add not only to the
amount of ‘stuff’ in the universe, but also to the number of types of objects
there can be. This is considered by many to be a price well worth paying.
So we see that the simple objection to an increase in entities only works
if they are not necessary. If they do enough work for us, then we can keep
them – there is a trade-off between introducing more ‘stuff’ and the use that
it can be put to in the theory. It is only when all other things are equal
between theories that the one with the fewest entities is to be preferred. And
all other things are not equal when we look at the interpretations of quantum
mechanics. By introducing many worlds into our set of things that exist, we
can give the best current explanation for the phenomenon that quantum
mechanics works. This claim will now be justified. This is not the place to
go into the details of alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics – the
interested reader is directed towards the ‘suggestions for further reading’ at
the end of the paper. Rather, we will concentrate on the differences between
the alternatives and the neo-Everettian interpretation, and why it is a better
theory.
There are two main contenders with the neo-Everett theory for best expla-
nation of the way the world is such that quantum mechanics works. These
are the various types of hidden variable theories such as [17], and the dy-
namical collapse models [18]. In hidden variables theories, particles etc really
do have single, definite, values for quantities such as momentum and posi-
tion (the eponymous ‘hidden variables’), it’s just that we can never find out
what they are. All we have access to is the probability distribution, from
which quantum mechanics is constructed. The hidden variables can either
be fixed, or there can be a probability distribution over them; in either case,
the Schro¨dinger equation is modified. Dynamical collapse models take ‘the
collapse of the wavefunction’ to be a real, dynamical, process and adjust the
mathematics of quantum theory accordingly.
The first thing to note is that, unlike the neo-Everettian theory, both
hidden variables and dynamical collapse models require a change to the for-
malism of quantum theory. This is not something to be accepted lightly. The
formalism of quantum mechanics is extremely successful, and we would need
very good reasons to change this. Moreover, what is being done is not truly
interpretation: the question with which we started this paper was: given that
quantum mechanics is correct, what is the world like? A hidden variable or
dynamical collapse theory is positing a different version of quantum mechan-
ics, rather than using the one that we have – and that has stood up to nearly
a century of testing – to find out what the world is like. So the question
that must be asked is: are many worlds so unthinkable that we are willing
to change the quantum formalism in order get rid of them? If we stick with
quantum mechanics as we have it, then the only option is many worlds.
Suppose we were to reject standard quantum mechanics. What would we
get in return? The answer, in both cases, is a much more complicated theory.
In both hidden variables and dynamical collapse theories there is the addition
of an extra layer of complex formalism on top of the standard q
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theory. Because this is being suggested as fundamental, there is no hope that
the basic theory may become simplified. Not only do we have less simplicity
in our formalism (which is bad enough), but both these alternative theories
also bring in their own commitments to additional entities. Various different
hidden variables theories add different things, from ‘corpuscles’ to carry the
hidden variables, to quantum potentials to push them around. Dynamical
collapse theories bring in a ‘thing’ that is the wavefunction that can collapse,
and is interacted with. None of these entities behave in a way that we are
entirely familiar with – so we are committed to a significant increase in the
number of types of thing that exist, and hence to a more complex system of
interactions between them. An additional level of complexity comes in when
we consider the hidden variables theories – not only do we have new entities
behaving in new ways under new laws, but there is an absolute bar on us
ever being able to see them. There seems to be no better explanation of this
given than that it must be there or else quantum mechanics would not work.
So if we want a single-world quantum theory then we are going to pay
dearly for it. Our formalism will become much more complicated, without the
expectation that a more fundamental, and simple, form may be found. We
have to introduce new kinds of entities, entirely different from anything else
that we think exists. Moreover, these entities act and interact in a completely
alien fashion; and, unlike the case of dark matter, this doesn’t even enable
us to keep our old theories. The alternative is significantly simpler. In return
for the acceptance of an increased number of entities in the world, we can
have a simple fundamental formalism, a simple fundamental dynamics and
no increase in the different types of things or interactions that we think exist.
One can hardly conclude from this that entities are being multiplied beyond
necessity.
It is worth re-iterating at this point that we cannot simply say that we
will reject all current interpretations of quantum theory and hold out for one
that is single-world but does not have all the drawbacks of current single-
world theories. We can only choose from theories that we have, not between
current theories and something that does not exist. We should also bear in
mind that, despite decades of trying, no-one has managed to come up with a
single-world interpretation without severe costs. An argument can be made
that, to a certain extent, it is not even possible that such an interpretation
could exist: somehow the multiple outcomes of the standard formalism must
be made reduce to one, which must involve additional formalism or entities,
or both.
Even from this initial discussion we can see that the pay-off from accept-
ing an increase in number of worlds is large, and the argument could even be
made at this stage that a many-worlds theory is evidently the best theory
for quantum mechanics. We will find as we proceed that there are even more
arguments in favour of the neo-Everettian interpretation, and we will discuss
them in detail as we reach them. Before turning to these further advantages,
however, we will discuss what is widely perceived to be the greatest disad-
vantage of any many-worlds theory: the infamous problem of probability.
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Probability
Let us turn again to the Schro¨dinger’s cat experiment. Suppose we leave the
diabolical device for the half-life of the radioactive atom, giving a probability
of 12 that the cat is dead. In a many-worlds picture, the cat is both dead and
alive, one state in each world. Now, what happens if we leave the device for
longer, say for tens of half-lives? We still have two identifiable patterns in
the state, one with a dead cat and one with an alive cat. What has changed
within the neo-Everettian world-view? Why is it that in one scenario it is
much more probable that the cat is alive than in the other, when it seems
that our physical theory says that these are identical scenes?
This appears at first sight to be a fatal problem for the neo-Everettian
approach. Unlike other many-worlds theories, we cannot even resort to the
dubious expedient of counting worlds to tell us which outcome is more likely.
The theory simply puts a measure over the worlds, given by the modulus-
squared of the wavefunction, and leaves us with no idea of how that measure
translates into probabilities. This is the problem of probability.
In recent years, work on this problem has largely centred around Deutsch’s
1999 proposal [19] to use decision theory to try to show that a rational agent
in an Everettian universe would lay bets on outcomes according to a measure
that is identical with the modulus-squared of the wavefunction. The argument
sometimes appears rather as a conjouring trick: an apparently solid result is
produced from seemingly innocent assumptions as if from thin air. As such
it is often, and I think rightly, viewed with suspicion.
In its recent, improved, form [20] the argument begins by considering
how a rational agent would act if they knew the universe to be Everettian.
Standard assumptions from decision theory are combined with the centrally-
important postulate of equivalence: if two outcomes have the same quantum-
mechanical amplitude, then they should be given the same likelihood by the
rational agent. With these assumptions and postulates in place, the distribu-
tion of likelihoods by the agent is easily (and fairly uncontentiously) shown
to follow the Born rule for the modulus-squared of the wavefunction.
Not unreasonably, objections (and arguments) have centred on the pos-
tulate of equivalence. The simplest objection is that the postulate begs the
question, smuggling in the very connection between amplitudes and rational
likelihood (and hence probability) that we are attempting to ground [21].
Such an objection, however, ignores the large amount of work that goes in
to arguing for the postulate: none of the proponents of the decision-theoretic
programme claim that equivalence should be self-evident.
The arguments in favour of equivalence take the form of a demonstration
that no other way of giving likelihoods to outcomes with equal amplitudes
is rational. Various quantum “games” are analysed to show that the rational
agent bets on equal-amplitude outcomes as if they were were equally likely.
Moreover, any other bets would be in fact irrational : there is only one way
to define the relative likelihoods of two outcomes with identical quantum
amplitudes.
These arguments have attracted a great deal of counter-argument, and
remain deeply contentious. Objections have been raised to the completeness
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of the discussion into alternative likelihood distributions based on similar-
amplitude outcomes [22]. Other objections centre on the description of phys-
ically distinct games by the same amplitude for the outcome, arguing that
concentrating on the part of the wavefunction that we already think of as
“the probability of the game outcome” begs the question of what a rational
agent should take as a likelihood [23]. Further objections can be made to
the programme as a whole: even if quantum amplitudes and rational like-
lihoods can be shown numerically identical, what does that tell us about
probability? The fact that two quantities are the same does not necessar-
ily tell us what the physical and conceptual connections between them are6.
An even wider objection could be made to the use of decision theory itself
in a multiple-outcome quantum theory, that in order to define the decision-
theoretic concepts in such a universe, the same conceptual work would need
to be done as to define probability itself. The “derivation” of probability from
decision theory would therefore be a curiosity without much real content.
It is certainly true to say that opinion remains deeply divided as to the
success of the decision-theoretic programme. It is, however, important to
point out that this way of solving the problem of probability is not an integral
part of the neo-Everettian theory; the acceptability or otherwise of the theory
does not turn on the adoption or rejection of the decision-theoretic argument.
The reason why we can take this view is that, in fact, probability in neo-
Everett is not nearly as problematic as it seems at first glance. Or rather,
we should say that it is problematic – but only as much as it already is,
both for any theory of quantum mechanics and also for everyday life. The
problems with probability that face the neo-Everettian interpretation are no
worse than those facing any theory that attempts to deal with probabilities
other than 1 or 0.
To see what we mean by this, let us return yet again to our unfortunate fe-
line. Let us abandon the idea of multiple outcomes, and say that Schro¨dinger’s
cat will be either dead or alive at the end, and that’s it. Again let us run two
experiments, one with an end state given by 1√
2
(|dead〉 + |alive〉), and the
other by 1√
3
(
√
2|dead〉+|alive〉). We discover, happily, that at the end of both
experiments the cat is alive. Now how are we to understand this? In both
cases we have the same physical outcome: the cat is alive. In one scenario we
want to say that this is the more likely outcome, but what is the physical
difference? It seems that we simply have a measure over somehow ‘potential’
outcomes, with no idea how that measure translates into probabilities. And
what could a probability possibly mean anyway? Either the cat turns out
dead or alive, so how can we tell if one outcome was more likely than the
other? What does it mean for us to say, before the box is open, that a tragic
outcome is more or less likely than a happy one? And if we were gambling
on the outcome, why would it not be entirely rational to place equal bets in
the two cases?
6 We should be particularly wary of this in quantum mechanics, where we have
the cautionary tale of the original measurement problem. This may be described as
the difficulty accounting for the numerical identity of a decohered pure state and
a mixed density matrix (so-called proper and improper mixtures).
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Of course we all know how to use probabilities in everyday life, including
everyday quantum mechanics, and I am not for a moment advocating aban-
doning the whole notion of probability because we don’t know how to ground
it, any more that I would argue for us to give up arithmetic because we do not,
fundamentally, know what makes “2+2=4” correct. The important point at
issue, though, is whether the adoption of a neo-Everettian theory makes our
understanding of probability even worse than it already is. I argue that all it
in fact does is show up the existing problems of probability by demonstrating
them in a different situation.
So far, it seems we are equally in the dark about probabilities whether we
have a single- or multiple-outcome theory. There is, however, a standard way
in which physics often tries to make sense of probability. This is what we are
all taught as statistical mechanics: probabilities refer to properties of ensem-
bles that are large enough to be considered, for our purposes, infinite. So,
for example, 1√
2
(|dead〉+ |alive〉) tells us that, when a large number of cats
are prepared in this state, roughly half will be found upon examination to
be dead, and half alive. This is, of course, very useful for statistical mechan-
ics where we have large numbers of particles that can act as our ensemble
(although even there we encounter problems as it isn’t actually infinite).
However, it does not seem to get us very far with our two experiment runs.
It’s not particularly enlightening in either case to be told what the result of a
large number of identical runs would be, as we are only running each exper-
iment once. Do we then have to say that for a single run (or a small number
of runs) there is no such thing as probability? So are our two experiments
in fact identical? Alternatively, given that actually we would quite like to
say that there is such a thing as “single-shot” probability, we might say that
the probabilities are really given with reference to what would happen if a
large number of identical experiments were run. However, now we are in the
uncomfortable position of wishing to call probability a physical property of
a hypothetical ensemble. It is difficult to see how such a definition could be
meaningful, let alone such a thing possible.
A further problem for those seeking to criticize neo-Everett on proba-
bility grounds is that we do, of course, have ensembles and frequencies of
outcome in neo-Everettian worlds. Within each world there will be access
to exactly the same notions as a single world in a single-outcome theory.
So even if an understanding of probability in terms of ensembles could be
given, that understanding would translate straight over into the neo-Everett
interpretation7.
It is, then, perfectly allowable simply to say that we don’t know what
probabilities mean in the neo-Everett theory, as we do not know what they
mean in any other theory. If we are willing to use probabilities at all, then
we should be willing to use them in neo-Everett, as it does not bring in any
different problems – it simply presents the same ones in a different light.
7 It is of course true that in some neo-Everettian worlds that if, say, a fair coin
were tossed a million times, then the frequencies of heads and tails would not match
the limiting distribution. However, this is something that we have no problem
thinking is possible(!) in a single world, so the mere existence of worlds such as this
is not an argument against neo-Everett.
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Probability problem are not unique to multiple-outcome interpretations of
quantum mechanics. If the arguments of Deutsch et. al. from decision theory
to probability are accepted, this does not simply bring the neo-Everettian
interpretation up to the standard of everything else; rather, it would be a
tremendous breakthrough in the understanding of probability, and would be
a very powerful argument for the truth of the theory. Contrary to popular
perception, then, probability is no problem for neo-Everett. At worst it is
neutral, being neither better nor worse than other theories, but at best it is
an immense bonus of the theory, and provides a compelling reason to think it
true. It remains, however, an area of controversy. We will turn now to what
is, uncontroversially, a major advantage of the neo-Everettian interpretation,
and one that is an important part of the argument that this interpretation
is the best available for quantum mechanics: locality.
Locality
In the experience of the author, a common reaction to the disclosure that the
neo-Everettian interpretation is local is bemusement, and then an increasing
suspicion that one is perpetrating a long and involuted joke. A slightly less
common reaction is simply to assume that one of the periodic arguments for
a loophole in the Bell inequality experiments is being made. In the light of
this, we will start with the important facts about the neo-Everettian approach
and locality and then go on to show how they come about. Firstly, it is local,
and local in the way that we normally mean when we talk about locality –
we are not getting our locality by the back door by changing the meanings
of the term. Secondly, neither the Bell inequalities nor the corresponding
experiments from Aspect onwards are considered to be incorrect or to have
loopholes8. These claims will, of course, strike many as impossible, so we will
now investigate how they can possibly be true. It will be useful at this point
to give a sort of sneak-preview of the result: essentially, the neo-Everettian
approach can be local because separated systems don’t need to signal in
order to demonstrate that they are entangled, as all possible outcomes of a
measurement are realized.
It is an incorrect, but unfortunately widespread, belief that the physical
world has been shown experimentally to be nonlocal in character. The chain
of this argument starts with the original paper by Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen (EPR) [25], carries on through Bell [26], and finishes off with the
Aspect experiments [27]. We will now consider this argument from the point
of view of the neo-Everettian interpretation. Because issues of nonlocality
are notoriously complex, we will go into these arguments in some detail.
8 I am not claiming that these cannot exist, nor am I taking up a position on,
for example, recent work on the meaning of the Bell inequalities [24] – I am simply
saying that these are not necessary to the locality of neo-Everett.
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The EPR paper
The form of locality put forward in the EPR paper is known now as ‘Einstein
locality’: no causal influences of any sort are allowed between spacelike sep-
arated objects. This is sometimes contrasted with ‘Bell locality’, where only
currently known causal influences are considered. Einstein locality requires
that at all levels of a physical theory there can be no causation happening
outside the lightcone, that there is an absolute meshing with the spacetime
structure of relativity theory, not just with its phenomenology. This is usu-
ally argued for by appeal to paradox: were we able to signal outside our
lightcones then it would be possible to send signals back in time and, for
example, prevent those same signals being sent in the first place. However,
Einstein locality goes beyond the requirement that such paradoxes cannot
be constructed, and states that even causal influences that cannot be used
to signal in this way cannot propagate between spacelike separated objects9.
The argument of the EPR paper concerns the completeness of quantum
theory (that is, whether “every element of the physical reality... [has] a coun-
terpart in the physical theory”), and is given in two parts. Apart from the
criterion of reality, the first part is not actually necessary for their arguments.
This criterion says that
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with cer-
tainty (ie with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quan-
tity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to
this physical quantity.
In the second part of the paper, EPR assume that quantum mechanics is
a complete physical theory and then show that this entails the contradiction
that it is not complete. They do this by looking at the reality of values of
non-commuting operators.
Two particles are entangled and then sent to different locations. If an
observable Xˆ is measured on the first system a then the state of the particle
b is given by ψ
(b)
x . Similarly, if an observable Yˆ is measured on a then the
state of b is given by ψ
(b)
y . Now if there is no signalling at any level between
a and b (this is the place where the locality criterion enters the argument),
and if QM is a complete theory, then ψ
(b)
x and ψ
(b)
y describe the same reality,
that of the actual physical state of b.
EPR now consider the case where [X,Y ] 6= 0. In this case, the two wave-
functions belonging to the same reality are eigenfunctions of incommeasur-
able operators, and from this EPR conclude that the values of these operators
are real simultaneously. A way of seeing how this works is the following. In
the real world we measure Xˆ on a. There is however a possible world in which
we measure Yˆ on a. In the actual world, b then has a value of Xˆ predictable
with certainty. In the possible world, b has a value of Yˆ predictable with
certainty. However, any values that b has must be the same in both this
actual and possible world because there is no causal link between a and b, so
9 These constructions of Einstein locality come later, in explications of the EPR
paper: in the paper itself this form of locality is assumed.
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which one of Xˆ and Yˆ is actually measured cannot make a difference to the
values possessed by the particle b. Therefore, b has actual values of Xˆ and
Yˆ . The strength of this argument lies in the nature of the reality criterion:
it depends on whether something can be predicted with probability 1, rather
than depending on any actualization.
The idea that these operator values have simultaneous reality is, naturally,
in defiance of the initial assumption that QM is complete. They therefore
conclude that QM is not complete10.
Bell
We can, of course, negate the EPR conclusion if we drop the locality principle.
In this case, then, the measurement performed on system a affects the real
state of affairs at b and the EPR argument fails. The EPR paper therefore
leaves us with a choice: either quantum mechanics must be non-local in a
sense that causes the EPR argument to fail, or else it is incomplete. If it
is incomplete then it must be completed – which would lead to a hidden-
variables type theory.
The most fully worked-out hidden variables theory is the de Broglie-
Bohm theory (see for example [28]), and it was this theory that Bell was
interested in when he came up with his famous inequalities [26,29]. In the
de Broglie-Bohm theory the wavefunction is defined on the configuration
space of particles, and changes to one particle have nonlocal effects on other
particles via the quantum potential. Bell wondered if this was a feature that
any hidden-variables theory must have, and came up with his inequalities as
a way of answering this question. If the inequalities were violated by quantum
mechanics, then no local hidden variables theory could reproduce its results.
We will start by considering the particular type of hidden variables the-
ories to which the de Broglie-Bohm theory belongs: that of deterministic
hidden variables theories. The values of the hidden variables exactly deter-
mine the outcome of measurements with no residual probabilistic behaviour.
Consider a very simple Bell-like set-up. The spin of an electron, e1, is mea-
sured along the directions a or a′, and that of a second electron e2 is measured
along b or b′, resulting in measurements an, a′n, bn, b
′
n (each of which is ±1).
The Bell function is then
γn = anbn + anb
′
n + a
′
nbn − a′nb′n (2)
A Bell inequality can only be derived if the RHS can be factored; that is, if
γn = an(bn + b
′
n) + a
′
n(bn − b′n)
10 What we have used here is not the logic of the paper as it is presented. EPR
use the first part of the paper to show, formally, [p ∨ q] where
p: quantum mechanics is not complete
q: values of noncommuting operators do not have simultaneous reality
They then use the second part to show [¬p → ¬q]. Put together, they conclude
[p ∨ q] ∧ [¬p → ¬q] ⊢ p. However, in the course of the second part they prove, as
we have shown, the much simpler proposition ¬p → p ⊢ p, again giving them the
desired conclusion that quantum mechanics is not complete.
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This is the locality principle of a deterministic hidden variables theory.
The conditions under which this is possible are similar to EPR’s locality
principle: that the results that occur when e1 is measured are not contingent
on what is being measured on e2. That is, that an and a
′
n are the same
regardless of whether bn or b
′
n was being measured on e2.
Since Bell, work has also been done on a more general class of hidden
variable theories, that of stochastic hidden variables theories. In these cases,
the hidden variables do not fully determine the results of experiments, but
rather determine a probability distribution for the outcomes. This changes
the conditions under which a Bell inequality can be derived. The locality
principle here cannot deal with individual outcomes, as in the deterministic
case, but rather must concern the probability distributions that the hidden
variables set up. The condition for a Bell inequality to be derived in this case
is known as factorizability. If we have two sets of possible results at a and b,
{ai} and {bi}, and a distribution of hidden variables λ, then factorizability
means that
P (ai, bi, λ) = P (ai|λ). P (bi|λ). P (λ) (3)
Following [30], this condition is usually decomposed further into two sep-
arate conditions, both of which must hold for factorablity to be possible.
They are parameter independence and outcome independence11. Parameter
independence states that a probability distribution cannot be affected by
manipulating causally unconnected entities (such as the settings of a remote
apparatus). That is, if the {λ} are fixed, then changing the remote apparatus
setting does not affect the probability distribution. Outcome independence
states that, for a fixed set of the hidden variables, any pair of outcomes of
measurements on unconnected systems must have independent probabilities.
The combination of outcome independence and parameter independence
forms what is known as ‘Bell locality’ (see for example [32, p75]).
Statistical locality
As well as the EPR and Bell results, there is a third important constraint
on the nature of quantum non-locality. This is that, if any such non-locality
exits, then it cannot be used to communicate non-locally. This is owing to the
well-known no-signalling theorem (see for example [33]), which states that
information cannot be transmitted by manipulating quantum correlations. A
user-friendly proof of this can be found in [32, p116], which we will outline
here.
There are two systems, A and B. System B can be subject to a pertur-
bation acting only on itself, 1 ⊗ UB. a ⊗ 1 is an operator acting on system
A only. Working in the interaction picture, a evolves under the unperturbed
Hamiltonian and the overall wavefunction changes only when a perturbation
is present. We model an attempt to change the statistical properties at A by
a perturbation on B.
11 In [31] these are termed “locality” and “completeness”.
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The wavefunction after such a perturbation (at time t′) is given by
|ψ(t′)〉 = (1 ⊗ UB)|ψ(t)〉
The time-evolved operator a at t′ is a(t′). We now consider the statistical
distribution of a after the perturbation has been applied:
〈ψ(t′)|(a(t′)⊗ 1)|ψ(t′)〉 = 〈ψ(t)|(1 ⊗ U−1B )(a(t′)⊗ 1)(1 ⊗ UB)|ψ(t)〉
= 〈ψ(t)|(a(t′)⊗ 1)|ψ(t)〉
That is, the probability distribution at A is the same regardless of any per-
turbation on B. This is known as statistical locality, because it shows that for
two systems which are only connected by quantum correlations (rather than
causal influences) the statistics at one cannot be affected by operations on
the other. It is important to note that, unlike the Bell and EPR arguments,
this is a straightforward mathematical theorem with only one prior assump-
tion: that the probability distribution is given by |〈ψ|ψ〉|2. This being such a
foundational part of quantum mechanics, it is safe to say that the conclusion
that statistical locality must be obeyed is an extremely strong one.
One immediate consequence of the no-signalling theorem is that Einstein
locality can never be violated at a phenomenological level12. Different theo-
ries about how quantum statistics come about may have non-local elements
in them (as for example hidden variables theories do) or be structurally in-
compatible with relativity, but the statistics themselves can never show a
violation of Einstein locality. Whatever non-locality there is, it must be hid-
den to this extent.
Local realism
We now have what looks like a complete argument for non-locality in QM.
After deriving his inequalities, Bell showed that in certain situation QM does
violate the inequalities, so any hidden variables theory must have non-local
elements. Together with the EPR argument this seems clear-cut. Either QM
is non-local or it is incomplete, but even if it is incomplete then it must
still be non-local (non-local here in the Bell sense of violating parameter or
outcome independence (or both), rather than the stronger Einstein sense).
However, this non-locality cannot be used to create anything like causal para-
dox because it cannot be used to send information. Such a view of locality in
QM is correct for almost all realist interpretations. For each interpretation
the definition of locality is slightly different (see [32]), but fundamentally the
notion is the same, as is the fact that there is non-locality (albeit hidden).
Very often the language of “local realism” is used to describe the state of
affairs that is to be ruled out by this chain of reasoning13. The EPR argument
for the incompleteness of QM (and hence the necessity for a hidden variables
12 See [34] for a full discussion of how QM is phenomenologically compatible with
relativity.
13 See for example the original Aspect paper [27], which was entitled “Experimen-
tal Test of Realistic Local Theories via Bell’s Theorem”.
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theory) can be circumvented both by denying the (Einstein) locality principle
(as is the case with, for example, dynamical collapse theories) or the realism
principle (the Copenhagen interpretation, as local and non-realist, is a good
example [35]). As a consequence, it is often incorrectly concluded that the
only possible interpretation of quantum mechanics which could incorporate
both realism and locality is one in which quantum mechanics as we have it
is incomplete - that is, a hidden variables theory. The Bell inequalities, as
conditions that possible local hidden variables theories must satisfy, are then
seen as the conditions on a local realist interpretation. As they find that such
an theory cannot reproduce the results of quantum mechanics, it is common
to find statements such as [36] that describe tests of the Bell inequalities as
“quantum mechanics vs local realism”.
Such statements are incorrect. They do not follow from the arguments
given above because there is a third way in which the EPR argument can
fail, which does not necessitate the denial of the assumptions of either locality
or realism. The third assumption that can be questioned is that which makes
the contradiction right at the end of the EPR argument: that if the values
of Xˆ and Yˆ have simultaneous reality but not simultaneous predictability
then quantum mechanics is incomplete. This is only a contradiction if there
is only a single world in the theory. In the case of a many-worlds theory,
the values of Xˆ and Yˆ have simultaneous reality in different worlds, but the
non-predictability of values of non-commuting operators pertains to within
a single world. In such an interpretation, the real and possible worlds of the
exposition above are both actual worlds.
It is interesting to note that as we have broken the argument at the
EPR stage, as far as Everett theories are concerned the Bell inequalities are
not in the first instance connected with questions of locality. ‘Bell locality’,
in the forms of parameter and outcome independence, does not necessarily
mean any such thing – they are conditions that must be met for factorability
to occur, and this is a locality condition dealing specifically with hidden
variables theories. It does not necessarily mean anything for Everett theories
– and, indeed, outcome independence is prima face violated whenever there
is entanglement.
It is therefore not necessary that a local realist theory is a hidden vari-
ables theory – the EPR argument does not rule out the possibility that a
many worlds theory could be local and realist. Hence, without an argument
that this is not possible, we are not entitled to describe the Bell inequalities
as debating ‘local realism’. They deal with the conditions on one type of local
realist theory, but not all types. If a similar phrase is wanted, ‘single-outcome
local realism’ describes what is being discussed – for every interaction there is
only a single outcome and hence a single world. Only within that restriction
does the EPR argument show that a local realist theory must be a hidden
variables one. It is perhaps the best-kept secret in quantum mechanics that
the Bell inequalities do not track locality when there are multiple outcomes
of experiments, even though the literature on this goes back more than two
decades ([37,38,39,40,41,34], amongst others). Indeed, it is difficult to un-
derstand in this situation what the elements of a Bell function such as (2)
could refer to: an etc. are defined as single outcomes to single experiments,
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in a way that we do not have in the neo-Everettian interpretation. If we
look further at the factorizability criterion (3), we can see even more clearly
that this refers to entities that simply are not present in our theory: we have
neither hidden variables λ, nor classical probability distributions over single
outcomes. These are all elements of the hidden-variables theories to which
Bell inequalities refer, so it is not entirely surprising that in their absence, in
an Everett-type theory, the inequalities tell us nothing about the locality of
the theory.
So we are left with the possibility that ‘multiple-outcome’ local realism is
possible. This is of course not to say that any many-worlds theory is neces-
sarily local. Most, in fact, are not – for example, Deutsch’s original version of
his many-worlds approach had instantaneous non-local splittings of worlds.
However, the neo-Everett interpretation with which we have been dealing is a
local realist theory that reproduces exactly the results of orthodox quantum
theory.
The realist credentials of neo-Everett are obvious, dealing firmly as it does
with what the theory says exists ‘out there’, but its locality may be slightly
less evident. Moreover, this is strong, Einsteinian, locality with no causation
outside the lightcone. We know from the EPR argument that if an Everett
theory is local and realist, the fundamental reason for this must be because
it is multiple-outcome, as this is the only other way to evade the argument.
That is, when a measurement (or indeed any other interaction – measurement
is not special in neo-Everett) occurs, it is not required that one outcome out
of many is chosen to be special. For example, in an EPR-type experiment
most interpretations of QM need a mechanism whereby the second particle
knows what was measured on the first, in order for the corresponding state to
be actualized. Because all possible states of the second particle are actualized
anyway in neo-Everett, this sort of a ‘signal’ is not needed.
Of course, the second particle is still correlated with the first in neo-
Everett, and at first glance it would seem that some sort of non-local signal
is needed, to tell the worlds of the first particle how they join up with the
worlds of the second particle. This is indeed necessary in those many worlds
theories that have spatially extended worlds that split instantaneously. It is
not, however, necessary for a faithful many worlds interpretation to have such
a worlds structure, as there is also the fact of statistical locality. Correlations
between distant systems cannot be seen while the systems are still separated –
it is only when information about the statistics from both systems is brought
together in the same place that the correlations can be calculated. What
happens in neo-Everett is that, instead of spatially extended worlds from
the outset, when the systems are separated they have worlds local to those
systems, with no connection to the separate system. When the information
on the systems is brought together, however, the two separate sets of worlds
‘join up’ to make one set. If there is any correlation between the two systems
then the worlds join up in a specific way; if not, the joining is completely
random. Therefore spatially extended worlds only occur when the relevant
systems have come into causal contact, such causation being entirely physical
and within the light-cone. No non-local effects of any kind occur either to
create the worlds or within the worlds.
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To see how this works in detail, consider the simple Bell experiment above.
We will look only at the worlds that are relevant to the experiment – as noted
before, there are many other possible ways of decomposing the state. Particle
e1 is measured along b and b
′ n times, and e2 is measured along a and a′ also
n times. Spatiotemporally local to e1 there are many worlds, corresponding
to all the possible outcomes of 2n measurements, and similarly for e2. So, for
example, if n = 1 then at e1 we have four worlds. In one there is an electron
that has been measured along a, a detector registering “a1 = +1”, and (if we
like) an experimenter who is reading this detector, and who sees this single
outcome to a measurement along a. In the other worlds we have the similar
situations for the other three outcomes. However, at this point there is no
way for an experimenter at either site (and in any world) to construct a Bell
inequality – they have access only to their own statistics which, because of
the no-signalling theorem, are not dependent on the experiments happening
in the other place. It is only when, for example, the experimenter on e2
sends her results to e1 that he can then construct an inequality and see the
correlations. It is at this point that the worlds corresponding to measurement
result on e2 come into contact with those of e1 and, in a completely local
operation, join up as dictated by the entanglement between the two particles.
So in the end the experimenter who sees a certain set of statistics at one site
joins up with the experimenter at the other site who sees statistics which are
correlated due to entanglement with the first set.
It is the same for all quantum phenomena that exhibit what are normally
called ‘non-local’ effects. It is only when information has been communicated
from one to another via a classical channel that the ‘non-locality’ becomes
manifest. Another good example is superdense coding14 [42]: although at
first sight it looks as if Alice has changed the state of Bob’s qubit when
she performs operations on her own, it is only when she then sends Bob
her qubit that he can extract the information from the correlations between
their qubits. A further example can be found in [43], where a fully formalized
entanglement swapping protocol is worked through locally.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of this result. To begin with,
there is the significance for quantum mechanics itself – that a faithful, lo-
cal and realist physical implementation of the formalism is possible. This
has major implications for all aspects of quantum theory, and for quantum
computation in particular. It is not uncommon to find nonlocality referred
to as a computational resource, closely connected with entanglement, which
is seen as its generator. Entanglement is widely regarded as the particularly
quantum resource available for computing, and is indispensable in an analy-
sis of quantum computing. If it is no longer to be viewed as fundamentally
non-local, that opens up the possibility of being able to track a ‘flow’ of in-
formation during computation, showing how information is transmitted and
stored. This also leads to the possibility of a local analysis of quantum compu-
tation, and indicates that we can locate the information processing at every
point in particular qubits or qubit groups15. This is particularly interesting
14 See [34] for a full discussion.
15 This was the motivation behind the development of the Deutsch-Hayden for-
malism [44,43]. More broadly, this ‘logical Heisenberg picture’ [45], while not an
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in the case of distributed quantum computing [46], where teleportation is
used to link quantum processors. Not only will an analysis of the processors
themselves be local, but we will also be able to track the information flow
between processors as it is carried by the bits in the ‘classical channel’ of
teleportation.
For quantum theory more generally, the most important advantage of
locality is that it removes one of the major barriers to forming a theory of
quantum gravity. There is no longer the necessity of reconciling a structurally
nonlocal quantum mechanics with a fundamentally local spacetime – quan-
tum theory can now be interpreted as itself fundamentally local . On a more
theoretical level, within quantum theory itself we also have the removal of
the somewhat unsatisfactory situation that there is some manner of ‘con-
spiracy’ that produces a non-locality that is nevertheless even in principle
uncontrollable (the no-signalling theorem). With no non-locality, statistical
locality does not appear as if by magic, and the mathematical agreement
with relativity emerges from a structural similarity.
This, then, is one of the most important arguments for the neo-Everettian
interpretation. If we accept many worlds, in the neo-Everettian form, then
we can have a local quantum mechanics. No other realist quantum theory
gives us this, as any single-outcome realist interpretation will be subject
to the EPR+Bell argument. Locality is so important, both for information
processing and for the creation of a quantum theory of gravity, that there
must be significant drawbacks with any theory that offers it, if we are not to
accept that theory. I would argue that the acceptance of multiple outcomes
is a small price to pay for a local quantum mechanics.
Computation in many worlds
The use of the neo-Everettian interpretation has many implications that are
specific to quantum computing, and in this section we will discuss some of
the main areas. We will then show how the neo-Everettian theory rebuts
objections that have previously been raised to the whole notion of describing
a computation in many-worlds terms. At the same time these objections,
combined with some interesting new developments in the field, will help us see
the most important consequenses of a neo-Everettian view in computation.
Along with locality, probably the most important consequence of a neo-
Everettian view of computation is the relation between quantum and clas-
sical processors. Put simply, in neo-Everett there is no fundamental quan-
tum/classical divide. Bits are not, in fact, a different sort of thing altogether
from qubits. Classical processes are a subset of quantum processes, in specific
integral part of the neo-Everettian interpretation, nevertheless does good work as a
native formalism for the theory. Locality is manifested by the assignment of a ‘de-
scriptor’ to each system, the properties of which change only under local operations.
This formalism also demontrates the formal as well as dynamical separability of the
interpretation: the descriptors for subsystems completely determine the full system
descriptors. If we are happy with calling the descriptors properties of the subsys-
tems (physically meaningful even though they are not locally fully determinable),
then local properties fully determine global ones.
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circumstances. This is an advantage on two fronts. Firstly, the fact that we
do not have a distinct idea of where the classical/quantum divide is anyway
is explained by there not being a distinct divide. Secondly, we now have fun-
damental connections between the different resources of computing. Rather
than two separate sets of resources that nevertheless may be interchanged
in certain situations16, we now have physically the same resource being put
to different uses – a bit is a qubit with the coherence data neglected. One
direct advantage of this is that we can formalize an entire protocol using the
same method, rather than requiring a formal shift between bits and qubits
at various points.
This picture also changes our ideas of how information is processed.
Again, it is not that there is a fundamental difference of kind between quan-
tum and classical computation; rather, classical computation is a subset of
quantum. The difference becomes one solely of the conditions under which
the computation happen, such as decoherence. One particularly fascinating
consequence of this is that in both cases, of quantum and of classical compu-
tations, there are multiple computational worlds. This is one of the biggest
changes in how we have to view classical computing, as decoherent quantum
computing; the difference is in the presence or absence of the coherence data.
As a consequence, questions that are often asked about the relationship
between quantum and classical computing need to be turned on their head.
Instead of starting from the view that we know what classical computing is,
that it is all sorted out and understood, we begin from quantum computation
as basic. It is not quantum computing that is ‘strange’ and in need on expla-
nation, but rather classical – rather than ask why quantum computers can
do more than classical, we ask why classical computers are restricted from
carrying out all the tasks of a quantum computer.
In a similar way, our understanding of bits and qubits needs to be re-
versed. Rather than attempting, as has historically been the case, to define
qubits in terms of bits, in our neo-Everettian picture it is the bits that stand
in need of description. Rather than being defined in terms of classical mes-
sages, a bit becomes the information transmitted from a decoherent qubit.
This, then, is the picture of computation that neo-Everett gives us. Quan-
tum information, processing and communication is fundamental, and the
classical counterparts must be constructed by giving a set of restrictions to
the quantum situation. It is those restrictions that are responsible for the
difference in computational ability of quantum and classical systems. All
processing and communication is local and continuous; information does not
‘jump’ between coders or processors, it must all be transmitted by a physical
system moving between points in accordance with relativity. Fundamentally,
all parts of the state of a computation exist, both in the classical and quan-
tum cases.
16 For example, with shared entanglement, two bits may transmit one qubit of
information (teleportation) or vice versa (superdense coding).
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“A Quantum Computer Only Needs One Universe”
We can see already that there are significant advantages to considering quan-
tum computation from the point of view of neo-Everett. The view does, how-
ever, have its detractors. We will consider here in detail the paper [47], which
presents several arguments against the use of Everett-style theories to un-
derstand quantum computing. Dealing with the points raised will not only
show how the arguments are not valid for the neo-Everettian theory given
here, but will help fill out the conception of quantum information theory and
computation that we have.
The main argument of [47] is that “[q]uantum computation is... not well
described by interpretations of quantum mechanics which invoke the concept
of vast numbers of parallel universes. ”, and that statements along the lines
of “a quantum computer can perform vast numbers of computations simulta-
neous” are “sufficiently misleading that [they] should have a ‘health warning
label’, ”. I will address Steane’s seven ‘remarks’ and show why I think that,
contrary to a ‘warning label’, a neo-Everettian description of quantum com-
putation should come with a ‘glowing recommendation’ label! It is important
to note here that I am not making the claim that Deutsch gives [48, p217ff],
that quantum computing is proof of a many-world theory. We don’t need to
make such a claim that quantum computers are, in Steane’s words, “wed-
ded to ‘many worlds’ interpretations” in order to see that neo-Everett has
distinct advantages as a physical picture for computing and, I would argue,
is the best physical explanation for the phenomena. Furthermore, we will
see that some of the elements of the discussion that have been taken to be
indicative of a single-world viewpoint do actually emerge naturally from our
neo-Everettian theory.
Objections from Information Theory
Steane’s three remarks, 1, 2 and 6, object on the basis of information theory.
In the first remark he notes that the information content of the output of a
quantum computation is the same as for a classical one of the same length.
Steane thus uses this to say that it is “not self-evident that a quantum
computer does exponentially more computations than a classical computer”.
We first note that we do not, typically, define the complexity of a calcu-
lation in terms of the information content of the output. To take an extreme
example, the output of both of the two questions “does 1+1=2?” and “can
every even number greater than 2 can be written as the sum of two primes?”
is one bit (yes/no), yet we would not wish to say that the resources needed
to calculate them are the same! Secondly, it is important to realize that this
way of framing the question takes classical computation as basic, in the exact
way that was warned against above. A quantum computer is not constructed
by ‘gluing together’ many classical computers – we say instead that within
a quantum computation we may identify many computational worlds. If we
are to model quantum computers in classical terms then of course we will
need exponentially many more computations happening in a given time-step;
however, in the neo-Everettian picture this is not a modelling in fundamen-
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tal terms. We only need to explain how a quantum computer can perform
exponentially more calculations if we take classical computing as the basic
point of reference. The neo-Everettian theory does not, so is not touched by
this argument.
This is, in fact, precisely what Steane goes on to warn us about in his
second remark: that we should not base our definitions of computational
complexity on what is possible classically.We are therefore in complete accord
on this point.
Remark 6 is an interesting argument from the point of view of neo-Everett.
Steane argues that more efficient quantum versions of classical algorithms
do not generate as many intermediate (classical) evaluation results – as he
puts it, “extraneous classical information”. Putting his argument in neo-
Everettian terms, this can then be used to argue against being able to iden-
tify multiple classical-style computations within the main state. This in fact
shows up the problems that can arise when a classical understanding is taken
as primary, because it is not true that such “extraneous classical informa-
tion” is never generated, but rather that we do not have the technological
ability to extract it. Consider a quantum algorithm based on the quantum
Fourier transform, consisting of a global Hadamard gate17, a global function
gate18, and then another global Hadamard. During the middle, manipula-
tion, stage, suppose the state of the register is measured to give the value of
f(α). In the neo-Everettian picture, we are left then with multiple measur-
ing devices, each registering a particular value, and multiple experimenters
looking each at this piece of ‘classical’ information. Usually, by now deco-
herence would have removed the phase information from the vicinity of the
experimenter, and each measuring device and person would be quantum me-
chanically separate. However, suppose we had the technology to manipulate
the measuring devices and experimenters19 quantum mechanically, and to
shield them on long time-scales from decoherence with the outside world. In
this case, all the separate worlds can be re-interfered, and the algorithm con-
tinued, incorporating the measuring devices etc.. In each world there would
have been a measurement of the classical information content, and so a gen-
eration of the classical intermediate results affecting the wider world, but
because of the shielding from decoherence this did not prevent the algorithm
being completed. We can see in this example the lack of a fundamental quan-
tum/classical divide in neo-Everett: even classical information may still be
used in a quantum situation.
17 A Hadamard gate transforms a basis into the orthogonal basis. Under a
Hadamard gate, the computational basis transforms as |0〉 → 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ; |1〉 →
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). The importance of this gate in an algorithm is that the initial |0〉
state is thereby transformed into an equal sum of all possible computational states.
18 This acts as |α〉|0〉 → |α〉|f(α)〉 where f(x) is the function that the gate evalu-
ates.
19 If it is considered that a person brings in unnecessary complications then she
may be replaced by a computer.
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Mathematical Notation
In his third remark, Steane makes the point that often mathematical nota-
tion can be misleading, and that there are some cases where one can inter-
pret (na¨ıvely) what has happened as many more processes than have actually
occurred. Thus there is no straight argument from the existence of decom-
positions of the state such as (1) to the existence of many worlds.
Steane is correct that notation can be misleading, and also that we can
sometimes incorrectly say that many processes have happened when only one
has. However, one of the ideas that has hopefully been demonstrated in this
paper is that there is more going on in the neo-Everett picture than simply
extrapolating from the existence of the decomposition (1) to the existence of
many worlds. As we have said, what defines the worlds is their explanatory
usefulness and their stability and independence. Were these criteria not ful-
filled for the states in the decomposition, then we would have no right to call
them ‘worlds’ in our Everett theory. Moreover, the basic postulate of the neo-
Everettian interpretation, that the state which can be decomposed is fully
actualized, does not come from simply gazing at the mathematics, but from
close argument that this is the best interpretation for quantum mechanics.
Error-correction
The objection in Steane’s fourth remark is from error-correction theory: the
sensitivity to error in anN -qubit quantum computation is different from that
of 2N classical computations running in parallel. Such a classical computer
would be sensitive to errors of the order 1/2N , whereas from error-correction
theory we find the quantum computer to be sensitive only to O(1/poly(N)).
Steane uses this to question the idea that the 2N calculations are actually
taking place.
Again, this is explained naturally from neo-Everett. The difference with
a classical parallel computer is that an error process in a quantum computer
(such as decoherence) will act on the whole state being processed. In other
words, it will act on all of the worlds identified within the state in exactly
the same way. In classical parallel computing errors can happen to individual
computations (‘worlds’), but because the worlds are not fully independent
(see above) in quantum computation, errors act globally. From this, we would
expect the sensitivity to error to be O(1/poly(N)) – it is not a surprise.
The Identification of Worlds
Remark 7, and the first part of section 3, deal with perceived problems of
identifying worlds in the calculation in order to say that we have used ‘many
worlds’. The point is first made that the different worlds are not fully indepen-
dent — evolution is unitary. This is not, however, a problem for neo-Everett
as the claim is only that the worlds are identifiable, insofar as we consider the
manipulation stage. That is all that is claimed, not that they are completely
independent. The claim is that we can identify worlds within the state of the
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computation, rather than that the state is composed of many worlds. We will
return to this point later.
Further, it is pointed out that the state of the system in computation is
a single entity, not a composition of many entities. Steane contends that it
is a way of representing all the different states in a decomposition without
‘actually’ calculating them or having them really exist. An analogy is drawn
between identifying worlds in the state and calling them real, and granting
reality to the individual Fourier components of a wave.
The idea that the state ‘represents’ all the states of a decomposition
without them being real is trying to show that a many-worlds theory is not
the only physical explanation of quantum computation, so is not relevant
here. The analogy with Fourier components is quite interesting, however, as
it can be a classical example of what we are doing when we identify worlds
in a state.
We note first of all that when we are talking about physical systems
(rather than mathematical idealizations), ‘a wave’ is itself very much a struc-
ture defined ‘for all practical purposes’. It is the excitation of various parts
of the medium (say water) in different ways at different times — yet we call
it a single ‘thing’ because it is relatively stable and acts independently and
is explanatorily useful (we can have a useful theory which talks about waves
as single objects). We can mathematically analyze this object in terms of its
Fourier components. This is often useful mathematically; however in deciding
whether or not to grant them physical reality, we must look at their physical
usefulness.
In some cases, pace Steane, we do in fact wish to grant reality to the
individual Fourier components, for exactly the same reasons that we wish to
grant reality to individual worlds. One excellent example, given in [49, p393],
is the use of Fourier components in telecommunications:
Telephone companies literally superpose the electromagnetic render-
ings of many simultaneous long-distance messages in a single wave
train that is echoed by a satellite and then automatically analyzed at
the destination exchange into its several components, each of which is
transmitted over a separate private line. No doubt we may speak in
this case of genuine spitting... the signal could also be split into other,
meaningless components if the analysis were not guided by human
interests and aims
Here we have re-enforced the point that the splitting of the world is not
fundamental, but explanatory.
These points are very similar to an objection that is often raised to a
picture of quantum computation in terms of many worlds [50]. Although it
should be fairly evident by now that it does not impact on neo-Everett, it is
worth dealing with in detail to bring out one important aspect of the picture:
the breakdown in some situations of the ‘worlds’ concept. The objection is
that by the end of the computation we cannot tell in which of the computa-
tional worlds the computer has been — so why do we want to say that the
‘worlds’ are individual and separate?
Even asking the question in this way does not make sense in neo-Everett.
The state of the computation contains all the different worlds — this is the
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whole point, if it had only contained one then we would not have got speed
up. This is all, remember, within a single branch, or macrorealm: within the
state of the quantum computer in our single branch we can identify many
computational worlds. As we have noted many times, the worlds are not
wholly independent, and cease even for practical purposes to be independent
when they interfere.
This last point is the important one: at some points during the computa-
tion we can identify worlds within the state, and at others we cannot. That
is, the ‘worlds’ concept, as with all emergent concepts, breaks down at some
point20. This is neither a worry nor a problem, but simply a part of the fact
that we are dealing with structures that are only defined in certain practi-
cal situations. Consider a quantum Fourier transform-based algorithm, such
as the Deutsch algorithm [14]. We can identify worlds from after the first
Hadamard until after the manipulation stage, but in the final Hadamard
transformation the worlds concept breaks down as they interfere. All we can
say is that before the transformation we could identify p worlds, and after we
identified q worlds. The worlds do not persist throughout the entire computa-
tion. At various points we may describe the state of the computation in terms
of many worlds, but there is nothing that requires that these worlds persist
throughout the entire calculation – just long enough for us to put them to
use. This is, in fact, the same situation that we have even after decoherence
has rendered worlds much more stable: it is still, in principle, possible to in-
terfere worlds that have previously decohered. After that recoherence, there
is no way of identifying ‘the’ world that is ‘the’ past history of an object.
This is not just an experimental limitation: as it is an emergent concept this
question simply makes no sense within the neo-Everettian notion of world.
Cluster-state computing
We finish by looking at Steane’s fifth remark. This concerns what is vari-
ously known as ‘measurement-based’, ‘one-way’, or ‘cluster-state’ quantum
computing [45]. The claim is that while a Fourier-transform based model of
computing may be amenable to a many-worlds description, this type of com-
puting is not. In measurement-based quantum computing, a ‘cluster state’ is
prepared before the algorithm is chosen, containing all the entanglement that
will be used during the computation. The algorithm itself is implemented by
various stages of measurements on different parts of the cluster, usually with
the measurements being dependent on the ‘feed-forward’ of previous results.
The Everettian description of this form of computing is in fact an area
of active research, and points to what is probably the main outcome of the
consideration of Everettian computing: quantum computing is not parallel
classical computing21. Computational worlds, if they can be described at all,
are not fundamental to the ability of a quantum computer to out-perform its
20 A good analogy with phonons is given in [9]: the concept of a phonon as an
entity is a good and useful one when they decay slowly on relevant time-scales, and
once the decay becomes quick the ‘phonon’ concept begins to break down.
21 A good discussion of the problems inherent in a ‘parallel computing’ description
of quantum computing can be found in [51, §4.1].
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classical counterparts22. While this goes against the usual informal view of
many-worlds quantum computation, it is nevertheless an unavoidable conclu-
sion of the neo-Everettian view. The computational ability of quantum com-
puters in neo-Everett comes from elsewhere: the existence of the full quantum
state, rather than one part of it. There seems, therefore, no prima facie rea-
son why the fully-quantum complete-state realism of neo-Everett will not be
able to describe measurement-based computation usefully, as we do not need
first to identify worlds in order to discuss the physical situation. We would,
however, expect that the neo-Everettian picture will be quite different from a
standard analysis of this type of computing, as such a picture would treat the
measurements and feed-forward within the computation as entirely quantum
mechanical. This would change our understanding of what is going on quite
radically. Initial results support this conclusion, with the main mechanism for
the computation being quantum information and entanglement transmitted
through the supposedly ‘classical’ channel of the measurement results. More
work on the exact mechanisms, however, remains to be done.
‘Full-state realism’?
Mention of entanglement brings us to an interesting rapprochement between
the neo-Everettian view and Steane’s conclusions. Recent work on entan-
glement and computation [52] demonstrates the fundamental physical role of
entanglement in a computation considered from a neo-Everettian standpoint.
Steane, in turn, concludes that entanglement rather than worlds leads to the
quantum speed-up. Throughout his paper, Steane is absolutely right to reject
a view of quantum computation that gives fundamental physical significance
to computational worlds. This view is rejected in the neo-Everettian view as
well. What we can see from the above discussion of Steane’s paper is that
this is a vitally important point. The interesting implications of the neo-
Everettian view for computation do not depend so much on the idea that
there are ‘many worlds’, as on the notions of the existence of the complete
state, no fundamental quantum/classical divide, and locality.
This is in fact a wider issue: all too often when discussing the Everett
interpretation, too much attention is focussed on the “many worlds” part,
frequently distracting from the real point that the worlds are not fundamen-
tal. One might almost be tempted to re-name the interpretation along the
lines of “full-state realism” to make this point: the identification of worlds
within the state is often possible, and is useful when we wish to make con-
tact between the quantum formalism and everyday experience (ie. to recover
predictive power), but is not the basic physical picture given by the inter-
pretation. The physical existence of the entire state in neo-Everett is what
gives it its explanatory power, especially in quantum computation, where
the ‘worlds’ concept can break down23. We need worlds for the explanatory
22 The observant reader may note the divergence here from the view put forward
in a previous manifestation of this paper (arXiv:quant-ph/0210204).
23 A further consequence of this is that, if this is so, then we may indeed wish
to question our adoption of the language of many worlds in the case of coherent
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power of the neo-Everettian interpretation as a whole (giving us the appear-
ance of singular cats and boxes), but for computation it is the realism of the
full state that gives us the physical picture.
There may, however, be one final twist for neo-Everettian quantum com-
puting, arising from some very new work. We may be able to recover utility
for a coherent worlds-based picture of computation in a framework where en-
tanglement and superposition are the same behaviour manifesting between
systems and worlds respectively [53]. This work is, however, highly contro-
versial, and the application to a many-worlds picture remains a conjecture –
albeit a tantalising one.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have introduced the main ideas behind a neo-Everettian
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, and its implications for
quantum computation. We have discussed the general roˆle of an interpre-
tation in quantum theory, and seen how the neo-Everettian interpretation
answers the questions raised. We have seen how the interpretation may be
considered the best available interpretation, for its simplicity, explanatory
power and its locality. We have also shown that the traditional problems
raised against many-worlds theories do not impact upon it.
In the field of quantum computation, we have seen how the main impact
of the interpretation concerns locality, the lack of a sharp quantum/classical
divide, and complete realism with respect to the state vector. This has impli-
cations both for how we describe a computation itself, and for the relationship
between quantum and classical computations. Work on the neo-Everettian
picture of computation is still ongoing, and it is likely that future devel-
opments will be able to clarify the roˆle played by the concept of a ‘world’
in coherent computing. A separate area of further research concerns new
forms of computation. Discussion in the foundations of computation tends to
concentrate on algorithms based on the quantum Fourier transform (QFT)
as these were historically prior to other forms. The quantum walk form of
computation [54] has not been considered in detail, yet has been an impor-
tant form of computation for many years. It is foundationally interesting as,
by contrast with QFT algorithms, there is no input during the computa-
tion: the algorithm is specified by the initial configuration. More recently,
measurement-based quantum computing has thrown up some very interest-
ing lines of research. This occupies a foundational area somewhere between
QFT-based and quantum walk computing, as the initial state provides all
the entanglement needed, but in order to run the algorithm there need to
be a series of measurements on this state. We can see that this topic will
continue to develop in interesting ways for some time to come.
states, and follow the standard neo-Everettian line by keeping that to describe the
situation post-decoherence.
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Suggestions for further reading
There is a vast quantity of literature covering the topics touched on in this
paper, and the following selection is neither complete nor comprehensive.
The aim of this section is to suggest ways in which the interested reader
can find out more about the various topics, and about the wider context
in which this article can be placed. All the suggested articles in this section
are available as preprints from either xxx.arxiv.org or philsci-archive.pitt.edu
(and frequently both).
Interpreting quantum mechanics
In this first section, I discuss two related areas within the philosophy of sci-
ence: realism and theory choice. Realism is the idea that there is an external
world about which we can learn and talk, and is a theory about what our sci-
entific theories refer to. This contrasts with for example, empiricism, which
holds that, despite their external form, scientific theories are really just talk-
ing about the results of experiments. A good introduction to these ideas is
the collection of articles
David Papineau. (ed.) The Philosophy of Science, OUP 1996.
Also useful are the following:
James Ladyman. Understanding Philosophy of Science Chs.5&6, Rout-
ledge 2002.
W. H. Newton-Smith. The Rationality of Science Ch.II, Routledge 1981.
The debate about how we chose between theories has a long history to it.
Chapters 1-4 of the above Ladyman book are good for this background. The
solution presented here, that we chose the theory that is the best explana-
tion of the observed phenomena, is known as inference to the best explanation
(IBE). This was presented in the classic text
Peter Lipton. Inference to the Best Explanation (Second Edition), Rout-
ledge 2004.
A helpful collection of texts for working out what exactly an explanation is, is
David-Hillel Ruben (ed.). Explanation, Oxford Readings in Philosophy,
OUP 1993.
Both realism and IBE are introduced informally by David Deutsch in his book
David Deutsch. The Fabric of Reality Chs.3&7, Penguin Press 1997.
We have also, in this section, made use of the correspondence theory of
truth, sometimes known as Tarski truth [55]. This is the notion that a propo-
sition X is true if and only if it is the case that X. This notion of truth is
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again part of the wider field of the philosophy of science, and not restricted
to quantum theory. Tarski’s formula was famously propounded in a science
context by Popper:
Karl Popper.Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowl-
edge, Routledge 1963.
Many worlds
Much has been written about the problem of measurement in quantum me-
chanics, and how the theory is to be interpreted (or not). A good introductory
text is
David Albert. Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Harvard University
press 1994.
Another, despite its somewhat off-putting title, is
E. Squires. Conscious Mind in the Physical World, Adam Hilger 1990.
The many-worlds and neo-Everettian interpretations are referenced fully in
this paper, and the above books also contain introductions to general many-
worlds type theories. Deutsch’s Fabric of Reality is again good for an informal
introduction, although the reader should be aware that there are significant
differences between his views and those of the neo-Everettian theory (for
example, neo-Everett does not hold that quantum interference is physical
scattering between systems in different worlds).
The incredulous stare
The ideas of ontological simplicity and structural simplicity emerge frequently
in discussions about theory choice. Ontological simplicity means that we are
committed in a theory to less ‘stuff’, and to fewer types of it. So, for example,
a theory with normal things in it is ontologically simpler than a theory with
normal things plus an aether. Structural simplicity means that the theory is
less complex – so, for example, the heliocentric model of planetary orbits is
structurally simpler than the geocentric model which required epicycles etc.
These two requirements will often be antagonistic. Ockham’s Razor refers
to ontological simplicity, and so is not the whole story. The online Stanford
Encyclopedia has a good introductory article on the concepts of simplicity:
Alan Baker. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/
Another good overview is
Elliott Sober. Simplicity, in W. H. Newton-Smith (ed.) A Companion to
the Philosophy of Science p433, Blackwell Publishing 2000.
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Probability
The problem of how we are to understand probability, in everyday life as
well as in science, requires far more space to do it justice than was available
here. In the discussion, I have concentrated mainly on they form of proba-
bility known as chance, which is the type that is ‘out there’ in the world,
demonstrated by the decay of an atom or the fall of a coin. A full account
of probability needs at the very least to consider the other types, which can
generally be grouped as ‘credences’ (what we believe to be the case, often
explained in terms of how much we would bet on a given outcome) and ‘epis-
temic probabilities’ (given all the evidence we have, what was the probability
of a given event X). In this section I dealt briefly with the idea of probabil-
ities being given meaning by ensembles of outcomes. This is known as the
frequentist theory of probability, and is one of several that have been offered
to explain what we mean when we talk of probabilities.
A good and thorough text for understanding the arguments around proba-
bility is
D. H. Mellor. Probability – A Philosophical Introduction, Routledge 2005.
For the Deutsch-Wallace decision theory programme to use the Everett in-
terpretation to give meaning to probabilities, see
David Deutsch. Quantum theory of probability and decisions, Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London A455, 3129-37, 1999.
David Wallace. Everettian rationality: defending Deutsch’s approach to
probability in the Everett interpretation, Studies in History and Philosophy
of Modern Physics 34, 415-439, 2003.
Hilary Greaves. Probability in the Everett interpretation, Philosophy Com-
pass 2(1), 109128, 2007.
For some of the objections to the programme, see
Huw Price. Decisions, decisions, decisions: can Savage salvage Everettian
probability? Pittsburg e-print 00003886, 2008.
Locality
Questions of locality and nonlocality in quantum theory have given physicists
and philosophers of physics many headaches over the years. It is important
to realize precisely what is and is not shown by the EPR and Bell papers,
and the Aspect experiments. A very good and thorough introduction to the
area is given by
36
Tim Maudlin. Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity (Second Edition),
Blackwell Publishing 2002.
Another good introduction is
Marc Lange. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics Ch.9, Black-
well Publishing 2002.
For a detailed account of the differing types of locality used in the Bell theo-
rems, and the possible connections between quantummechanical (non)locality
and relativity, see
Jeremy Butterfield. Stochastic Einstein locality revisited, Brit J Philos
Sci 2007; 58: 805 - 867.
Quantum computing
The implications of quantum computing and information theory for the foun-
dations of physics (and vice versa) is a small but active topic of ongoing
research. A very good article on this area is
Chris Timpson. Philosophical aspects of quantum information theory in
D. Rickles (ed.) The Ashgate Companion to the New Philosophy of Physics
Ashgate 2008 (arXiv:quant-ph/0611187).
A useful resource for articles on this topic is the special ‘Quantum Informa-
tion’ journal edition
Volume 34, number 3 of Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics, 2003.
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